The Human Terrain System (HTS) is a United States Army program using experts from social science disciplines such as anthropology, sociology, political science, regional studies and lingustics to provide military commanders and staff with an understanding of the local population. The goal is to give commanders insight into the population and how they may react in order to enhance operational effectiveness, save lives, and reduce military and civilian conflict.
The program was prompted by cultural problems between local populations and American forces after their invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan.
HTS has often been controversial[1][2] with the American Anthropological Association in 2007 publishing a statement opposing it.[3][4]
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The HTS concept has been largely inspired by the lessons drawn from the United States experience in Vietnam.[5]:144 During the Vietnam War, the U.S. military failed to take steps to understand the context of the Vietnamese cultural environment. The Vietnam-era CORDS experience provides crucial lessons that guided the development of an effective cultural intelligence program that can support tactical and operational level commanders today.[5]:147
The notion for the current HTS was suggested by Montgomery McFate Ph.D., J.D., and Andrea Jackson within their article, "An Organizational Solution for Department of Defense’s Cultural Knowledge Needs", Military Review (July-August 2005), 1821. From July 2005 to August 2006, Captain Don Smith, U.S. Army Reserve, of the Foreign Military Studies Office, implemented the concept. According to this concept, human terrain may be defined as the human population and society in the task force environment, characterized by cultural, anthropological, and ethnographic information about the local society.[6]
According to the U.S. Army, the Human HTS has been specifically designed as a project to help brigade commanders and their staff address cultural awareness shortcomings at the operational and tactical levels by focusing on understanding the human terrain: the social, ethnographic, cultural, economic, and political elements of the local population surrounding them.[5]:142 By understanding the human terrain in which insurgents live and function, HTS provides the task force with social-scientific support that is used towards the military decision-making process.[5]:142 Essentially, the purpose of the HTS is to explain to the commanders and soldiers the reasoning of the population and enemy, and reasons for hostility towards the US Army and forces.[7]:53
In July 2006, Colonel Steve Fondacaro (retired) was recruited by TRADOC G2 to manage the HTS program.[8] In response to a Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statement from Central Command issued in April 2007, calling for HTS Team in every Army Brigade and Marine Corps Regiment in Iraq and Afghanistan,[9] US Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates in September 2007 authorized a $40 million expansion of the program.[8][10][8][11] Maxie McFarland, the TRADOC G2, suddenly terminated Fondacaro's temporary position as HTS Program Manager in June 2010. After an initial announcement on USAJobs, the listing was cancelled and the manager position was filled by McFarland's executive officer, COL Sharon Hamilton. Her first tasks were to address personnel and recruiting issues, and restructure management practices, and address inter-agency Human Terrain needs. On 8 March 2011, the Center for Complex Operations hosted a conference titled Inter-agency Human Terrain Program and Requirements.[12] The Human Terrain System is no longer a proof-of-concept program though it is still under the auspices of United States Army Training and Doctrine Command. It was developed in response to identified gaps in commanders’ and staffs’ understanding of the local population and culture, the impact on operational decisions, and the poor transfer of specific socio-cultural knowledge to follow-on units.
In 2009, the US Congress directed that an independent assessment be performed to determine the state of the HTS Project. The task was sourced to the Center for Naval Analyses in Alexandria, Virginia by the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. The Center for Naval Analyses Assessment of the Human Terrain System contains the results of interviews of 19 out 71 commanders who were supported by the HTS Project. [13] The US Army conducted its own internal investigation of HTS as well but the results were not released.[14]
The initial funding for the Human Terrain System, which started off as the Cultural Operations Research - Human Terrain System (COR-HTS), came from the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO).[7]:29 With initial JIEDDO funding, HTS began a 5 team proof-of-concept effort that was to develop training curriculum, train and deploy teams (3 teams to Iraq/2 teams to Afghanistan) over a 2 year period. The objective of this effort was to validate the concept of expert civilian-military teams attached to deployed units in combat performing applied research to support optimal course of action development and selection by units, based on a more complete understanding of the local population. The enthusiastic support for HTS's approach in support of existing Operational Needs Statement by Army and Marine Corps units, US Central Command submitted a Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statement (JUONS) in April, 2007 requesting HTS support for all Division-level headquarters, Army Brigades and Marine Corps Regiments deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. Later that month, the HTS JUONS was approved for funding by the DOD Joint Rapid Aquisition Cell. This action effectively increased the HTS mission from 5 teams over 2 years, to 26 teams as soon as possible. DOD provided HTS funding until 2009 when funding resposnibilities were asumed by Army G2.
The approach is to place the expertise and experience of social scientists and regional experts, coupled with reach-back, open-source research, directly in support of deployed units engaging in military operations. HTS informs decision-makers at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. The HTS project is the first time that the military has done social science research and advising on a large scale, and at the brigade level.
At higher (e.g., Division) echelons in the field, larger teams called Human Terrain & Analysis Teams (HTATs) may be deployed. Human Terrain System teams do not collect actionable military intelligence, nor do they participate in lethal targeting.
The teams which deploy and support combat units are the Human Terrain Teams (HTT). They are supported by a Research Reachback Center (RRC) performing in-depth, long-term cultural research and analysis. The RRC is an element based in the United States consisting of cells of regionally focused social scientists and uniformed and civilian analysts providing access to a wide body of academic knowledge in order to rapidly address social, political, economic, historic and cultural issues in their area.
The Human Terrain System further advertises a network of Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) consisting of on-call, micro-regional focused academic and civilian sector experts. In theory, they provide specific support to the RRC including planning, training, role-playing and research.
The HTT's tool kit is mapping Human terrain (MAP-HT) software, an automated database and presentation tool that allows teams to gather, store, manipulate, and provide cultural data from hundreds of categories.[5]:150 HTS has developed the MAP-HT Toolkit, an integrated software suite provided to HTTs for data visualization and reporting. This includes software for Mapping (for e.g., spatial distribution of tribes and related social entities), Link Charts (for example, power structures and social networks in informal economies), and Timelines.[8][10] Some of the components in the toolkit include: ANTHROPAC, UCINET, Axis PRO, i2 Analyst's Notebook, and TerraExplorer—a 3D earth visualization application provided by Skyline Software Systems, Inc.. The data gathered assists with subjects such as key regional personalities, social structures, links between clans and families, economic issues, public communications, and agricultural production. The data will be compiled and stored in a larger archive, in order to be accessible for the military and other government agencies.[5]:150
Human Terrain Teams (HTT), which began in late 2003,[8] are social scientists and former/active military teams, embedded with deployed headquarters at Theater, Division, regional commands, and combat brigades in Iraq and Afghanistan to help military staffs in the field understand local cultures.[4] "Academic embeds" as the social scientists on teams are known,[15] help troops understand relevant cultural history, engage locals in a way they can appreciate, and incorporate knowledge about tribal traditions in conflict resolution.[4] In interviews, US military officers in Afghanistan have stated that the aim of the program is to improve the performance of local government officials, persuade tribesmen to join the police, ease poverty and protect villagers from the Taliban and criminals.
Human Terrain Teams consists of five members: a team leader, a cultural analyst, a regional studies analyst, a human terrain research manager, and a human terrain analyst. All act as experienced cultural advisers to the brigade commander. In order to further understand the responsibilities of each team member, one must comprehend the duties of each adviser:
Actual teams have ranged from three to eight members, and have ranged from entirely civilian to entirely military. Social scientists generally have come from fields other than anthropology. AnnaMaria Cardinalli, for example, who attracted attention for her report on sexual practices in Afghanistan,[16] was a musician and theologian.[17] The teams are fully integrated into unit staffs, providing advice on how to interact productively with the local population and represent the “human terrain” in planning, preparation, execution and assessment of operations.
HTT tours of duty are intended to bridge unit unit replacement cycles, ensuring a smooth and complete transfer of local area Human Terrain knowledge and cultural understanding as new units replace old ones. Subsequent to redeployment, many members of deployed HTTs return to function on the staff of HTS in various capacities, from research and analysis to training.
The HTT are responsible for three deliverables:
The approach was first applied in Afghanistan in 2006[18] and has since won the praise of officers who see concrete results in improved understanding of social connections in the tribal cultures encountered during phase iv operations (operations aimed at stabilizing an area of operations in the aftermath of major combat).[8][10][19] According to Col. Martin Schweitzer, commander of the 4th BCT, 82nd Airborne, the unit’s combat operations in Afghanistan had been reduced by 60 percent over a period of eight months.[8][20]
HTS should be acknowledged for advising a US military unit in Iraq on proper mealtime etiquette, i.e., not only how to properly eat, but also the gestures during the meal, and especially how to observe the Ramadan feast.[7]:15
In September 2007 US Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates authorized a $40 million expansion of the program.[8][10] Teams of anthropologists and social scientists are expected to be assigned to each of the 26 US combat brigades in Iraq and Afghanistan.[8][10] As of October 2007, the number of teams in Baghdad was expanded from one to six.[8][10]
Teams are composed of five members:[8][21] two civilians and three military personnel, according to Stars and Stripes.[21] Military Review defines embeds as "experienced cultural advisors" familiar with the area of operations.[19] Embeds also work within the framework of an overall Human Terrain System which includes a relationship mapping schema called MAP-HT.[19]
To map relationships, teams create databases of:
as well as using mapped knowledge and cultural insights to advise brigade commanders.[8][10] Embeds must also note and respond to the attitudes of US military culture, which values a "can do" attitude.[10]
HTS is controversial amongst academic anthropologists, many of whom perceive it as an attempt to "weaponize" anthropology.[22]
In 2007, the American Anthropological Association published a statement opposing the Human Terrain System.[23] They denounced HTT in October 2007, concerned it could lead to compromise of ethics, disgrace to anthropology as an academic discipline, and the endangerment of research subjects.[4] Some academics denounce the program as “mercenary anthropology” that exploits social science for political gain, fearing HTT could cause all anthropologists to be viewed as intelligence-gatherers for the US military.[8][20] Some academics draw comparisons to the Phoenix Program and Project Camelot during the Vietnam War. According to Richard Shweder, "Anthropologists feel almost polluted by contact with certain parts of the government. There's a breach-of-trust issue there that hasn't been repaired."[10] Conversely, these expressions of opinion from academic anthropologists has not precluded the participation by applied anthropologists in the program since 2006. David Matsuda, an academic embed from California, counters the reaction in the anthropology community: "I came here to save lives, to make friends out of enemies."[4]
On December 2, 2009, two years after denouncing HTS publicly, the American Anthropological Association released a report[24] based on a year long research project that interviewed several dozen selected individuals associated with HTS and HTS critics. Notably, the research plan did not include any onsite visits to HTS training locations, HTS headquarters or military units where HTS teams have served, nor did the interviews include the HTS program manager, senior social scientist or any other members of the HTS program staff. The report supported its 2007 denouncement of HTS, concluding that HTS was such a poorly conceived and executed program that “When ethnographic investigation is determined by military missions, not subject to external review, where data collection occurs in the context of war, integrated into the goals of counterinsurgency, and in a potentially coercive environment -- all characteristic factors of the [Human Terrain System] concept and its application -- it can no longer be considered a legitimate professional exercise of anthropology.” The AAA assessment and what they consider their detailed accounts of how Human Terrain has not addressed ethical problems, plus the report’s finding that HTS data is used as intelligence by the military, served as the basis for their conclusion that the program is a severe distortion of anthropological research and principles. HTS leadership contended that the study's lack of discipline, inadequate research, and conclusions in support of an organizational statement made years prior were predictable, spoke for itself and did not warrant further comment.
George Packer, award winning author of The Assassin's Gate: America in Iraq and New Yorker Magazine staff writer writes of the use of social science by the Pentagon in its counterinsurgency efforts, interviews Dave Killcullen, Montgomery McFate and Steve Fondacaro. He analyzes in detail the use of social science in support of military operations, commenting "At a moment when the Bush Administration has run out of ideas and lost control, it could turn away from its “war on terror” and follow a different path—one that is right under its nose."[25]
David Rohde two time Pulitzer prize winner with extensive experience in Afghanistan and Pakistan reports in the New York Times about the enlistment of social scientists in the counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan. Quoting a cavalry squadron commander Call it what you want, it works, said Colonel Woods, a native of Denbo, Pa. It works in helping you define the problems, not just the symptoms.[8]
Ann Marlowe, a writer who has written about Afghanistan, wrote a piece about HTT for the Weekly Standard in November 2007 stating that "there are some things the Army needs in Afghanistan, but more academics are not at the top of the list." Notably, she did not speak with the HTT directly.[26]
Some academics denounce the program as "mercenary anthropology" that exploits social science for political gain, fearing HTS could cause all anthropologists to be viewed as intelligence gatherers for the US military.[8][20] Some academics attempt to draw comparisons to the Phoenix Program and Project Camelot during the Vietnam War. According to Richard Shweder, "Anthropologists feel almost polluted by contact with certain parts of the government. There's a breach-of-trust issue there that hasn't been repaired."[10]
Audrey Roberts an HTT social scientist who spent close to two years on the ground supporting US Army Brigade at FOB SALERNO near Khost, Afghanistan expressed her clear reflection that operationally relevant understanding of the problems within the population leads to resolution of the underpinnings of the insurgency. [27]
In 2009, the University of Chicago Press published American anthropologist Roberto Gonzalez's book, American Counterinsurgency: Human Science and the Human Terrain, which criticized the historical roots, methodologies and ethics of the Human Terrain program. In April 2009, anthropologist David Price published a list of ten critical flaws in the Human Terrain program that the press have failed to seriously address.[28]
David Matsuda, an HTT Ph.D serving in Iraq, counters the reaction in the anthropology community: "I came here to save lives, to make friends out of enemies."[4] Furthermore, Michael Bhatia, an embedded anthropologist killed while serving in Afghanistan, contended that the social science community at large had a lack of understanding of what the HTT did.[29]
On November 4, 2008, HTT member Paula Loyd was surveying the village of Chehel Gazi with a US Army platoon. She was doused with gasoline disguised in a jar of cooking oil and lit on fire by Abdul Salam, an Afghan national. Loyd was severely burned over 60 percent of her body.[7]:110 Salam ran immediately, running 50 meters towards Don M. Ayala, another member of the HTT. U.S. Army personnel and Ayala captured Salam as he tried to escape.[7]:112 About ten minutes later, after learning of the severity of Loyd's injuries, Ayala shot Salam in the head, killing him instantly. Loyd, 36, died at Brooke Army Medical Center in San Antonio on January 7, 2009.[30] Ayala pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter in federal court in Alexandria, Virginia in February 2009. On May 8, 2009, he was sentenced to five years probation and a $12,500 fine.[31][32][33][34][35][36] On September 1, 2010, the Times-Picayune of Louisiana posted a documentary video of friends and family speaking in support of Ayala at sentencing.[37]
Nicole Suveges, a HTT IZ3 member, was killed on June 24, 2008, along with 11 other Soldiers, Iraqi government official and US Embassy personnel when a bomb exploded at the District Council building in Sadr City.[30][7]:9
Michael V. Bhatia, a member of HTT AF1, was killed along with two other Soldiers while riding in a unit Humvee vehicle in Khost, Afghanistan in May 2008.[38]
Both deaths were the result of command detonated mines/improvised explosive devices.[7]:17
During a 15-day drive in late summer of 2007, 500 Afghan and 500 US soldiers tried to:
An HTT anthropologist, Tracy St. Benoit,[39] identified an unusually high concentration of widows in poverty, creating pressure on their sons to join the well-paid insurgents. Citing St. Benoit’s advice, US officers developed a job training program for the widows. She also interpreted the beheading of a local tribal elder as an effort to divide and weaken the Zadran, rather than mere intimidation. As a result, Afghan and US officials focused on uniting the Zadran, one of southeastern Afghanistan’s most powerful tribes, thereby hindering the Taliban's operations in the area.[8]
800 Afghan soldiers, 400 U.S. soldiers and 200 Afghan policemen took part in the operation, in which Afghan soldiers raided houses of suspected militants.[40]
Stars and Stripes reported that in one Pashtun village, Kuz Khadokhel, HTT made it possible for negotiator Captain Aaron White to understand body language in the context of the culture, to identify leaders during negotiations, and to reinforce a perception of leadership by not conferring with fellow officers and by demonstrating good faith through projects facilitated by the Ghazni Provincial Reconstruction Team, including roads, a visit by the PRT’s mobile medical clinic, the construction of a deep well for irrigation, and the beginnings of a road to Afghanistan’s main Highway 1.[21]